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неотчуждаемости и неотъемлемости прав человека демократиче­
ской Конституции РФ не оказались на втором плане при описа­
нии сложного процесса обсуждения и принятия Конституции РФ 
1993 г. Ценность человеческих прав легко теряется, как подтвер­
ждает мировая история, когда начинается конфликт частных инте­
ресов конкурирующих лидеров политических партий, либо кон­
фликт интересов государства и общества. В условиях повышенной 
конфликтности современного мира важно развивать альтернатив­
ные (внесудебные, невоенные, ненасильственные) процедуры раз­
решения конфликтов и споров, т. к. процедуры медиации в поли­
тике, образовании, социально-экономической и правовой сферах. 
Необходимо формировать в современном обществе и государстве 
не разрушительную культуру противостояния, а созидательную 
культуру уважения и защиты человеческих прав и свобод, сохра­
няя и развивая наследие российского конституционализма.
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Central European constitutionalism — with special 
regard to the role of national sentiments and fear
This paper argues for a slightly unconventional thesis: public senti­
ments have been playing a formative role in Central-European consti­
tutionalism during the last twenty years. Legal scholarship interested 
in Central-European issues [1] has not paid serious attention to this 
phenomenon so far, it solely reflected on it as it were of a secondary 
importance [2]. However, if one takes into account the impact of public 
sentiments, it can foster a better understanding of the last twenty years’
constitutional development. In addition, the assessment of the role of 
public sentiments may open new perspectives for discussion.
The recent trends of Central-European constitutionalism have 
already been discussed from many aspects in the relevant literature. 
Philosophical, ideological, historical and legal arguments came up 
in order to explain its features [3]. However, contrary to the earlier 
approaches this paper relies on the findings of the so-called «law and 
emotions scholarship» becoming more and more popular in the United 
States. In one word, «law and emotions» scholars try to overcome the 
conventional and widespread modem approach separating law and 
the emotions as two distinct subjects that may have some occasional 
contact. They argue that law and the emotions overlap on many points 
and they can properly be understood with regard to each other [4]. So, 
these two phenomena— even if they seem to be generally incompatible 
with each other in the eyes of modem jurisprudence — can and should 
be studied together. Of course, this is a real methodological challenge 
since neither law nor the emotions have a clear conceptual meaning, 
their interpretations change by varying the philosophical bases. Yet, 
this does not make the analysis of affective impact on legal phenomena 
impossible at all.
1. From emotions to constitutional sentiments
Firstly, to get an adequate conceptual basis for further discussion, 
some methodological points should be clarified. As a starting point, it 
must be stressed that this analysis is not about the emotions in general, 
but it relies on the concept of constitutional sentiments. As Andräs Sajo 
elaborated it, constitutional sentiments are a part of general public sen­
timents and their distinctive feature is that they have a constitutional or 
public affairs relevance [5]. So, this paper does not intend to deal with 
the emotions in general, but it only formulates certain conclusions with 
a more moderate scope: the domain of public sentiments.
In general, public sentiments originate from socially interacting 
individual emotions that are able to offer stable, namely long-lasting 
and enduring, emotional patterns. It is argued by Sajo, if society reflects 
on these emotional patterns in public discussions for a longer while, 
a gradual homogenization and consolidation process starts and this may
lead to the formation of a new public sentiment. In this public senti­
ment creating process both culture and media have a prominent role. 
The earlier regulates how people can express emotions, while the latter 
provides various channels to do so. In sum, public sentiments are more 
than «simple aggregation of individual emotions»; they are structured 
common reflections on public concerns [6]. And, those public senti­
ments that are primarily focused on constitutional or political issues can 
become constitutional sentiments being able to influence both constitu­
tionalism and the corpus of constitutions.
It is worthwhile showing an example in order to illustrate the ear­
lier theory on the birth of public and constitutional sentiments. No one 
doubts that fear is a general human emotion and it can stem from many 
reasons. People may have fear of the uncertain future, unpredictable 
catastrophes, specific persons, illnesses and many other things. And, 
people may have fear of the uncontrolled, tyrannical power in a com­
munity, too. If people start to discuss their worries publicly and a longer 
debate emerges this fear begins to take shape as a structured and collec­
tive phenomenon acquiring a clear socio-political meaning: power must 
be limited, since the lack of control is dangerous to the society. Thereby 
a new constitutional sentiment emerges and it qualitatively differs from 
the individual worries since it is articulated within the conditions of the 
political sphere [7]. Moreover, if the constitution-maker is interested 
in taking into consideration these public concerns on the dangers of 
unlimited power there might be some chances that this public senti­
ment will be incorporated during on-going design of the constitutional 
architecture.
When and why can a constitutional sentiment be successful, mean­
ing that it is able to influence certain constitutional provisions? Obvi­
ously, many constitutional sentiments compete in a given historical 
moment and some of them are unable to exert any influence on the 
development while others may be seemingly successful. Sajö argues 
that the constitutional incorporation of public sentiments is always a 
result of power choice but there are some factors increasing the chances. 
A major one amongst them is morality. If a constitutional sentiment has a 
strong moral support namely that the people believes that it is generally 
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good and things should be so, this might provide a good chance to be 
reflected in constitutionalism in the longer run. The main reason is that 
politicians generally strive to make decisions in conformity with either 
the majority’s feelings or some widespread moral judgments. Just take 
the example of the abolitionist movement in North America or the for­
mative years of human rights declarations at the end of the 18th century. 
But, it must be emphasized, the constitutional incorporation of public 
sentiments is always culture and age dependent, therefore there are no 
general laws in this sense [8].
Having clarified the most important conceptual points a last remark 
should also be made on the validity of this constitutional sentiment- 
oriented legal understanding. This paper does not claim at all that this 
«law and emotions» approach focused on constitutional sentiments 
entirely explains the unique, maybe divergent, features of Central- 
European constitutionalism. That would be an apparent exaggeration of 
its explanatory value since, obviously, there have been many other fac­
tors — ie. historical, political and cultural ones — shaping the picture 
of these constitutional cultures. What the paper claims is much more 
modest, simply, the role of public sentiments are also worthy of consid­
eration since this way of thinking can make the picture more complete 
and detailed [9].
2. National sentiments as engines of constitutional development
It can hardly be denied that a so-called national renaissance has 
occurred in the region during the last twenty years. National sentiments 
broke out following the fall of iron curtain immediately [10]. Just think 
of the rebirth of Baltic States, the dissolution of Czechoslovakia and 
Yugoslavia in a relatively short period, and the birth of entirely «new» 
countries as for instance Moldavia or Slovenia. Seemingly, this process 
means that the people of Central-Europe reconstructed or reestablished 
both their national identity and the community framework of their exis­
tence. All in all, it has considerably changed the map of Central-Europe 
in ten years. Furthermore, this harsh rebirth of national sentiments may 
be regarded as a natural reaction to the internationalist and oppressive 
policies of the Cold-War period trying to neutralize the «national ques­
tion» in Central Europe.
Besides historical, political and international effects, this regional 
national revival has also become an engine of constitutional develop­
ment. Interestingly, it led to the formation of such legal institutions and 
solutions that were either entirely new or qualitatively different from 
the Western patterns on some points. That being said, the «westerniza­
tion» of Central-European constitutionalism that followed the fall of 
Soviet influence has been merged with the strong influence of national 
sentiments. Thus, behind the clear reception of the Western constitu­
tional patterns a not as obvious «nationalization» of these constitutional 
cultures happened, too.
The following examples may properly illustrate the earlier «nation­
alization» process.
I. At the beginning of 90s, the Baltic States all enacted such acts on 
citizenship that were openly discriminative against the Russian popula­
tion living in these countries. These acts linked the citizenship of a given 
state to the fulfillment of cultural requirements, for example, a good 
command of the official language. With Western eyes, these acts con­
travened the generally accepted standards of non-discrimination based 
on nationality, therefore the Council of Europe, specially the Venice 
Commission, was heavily engaged in the dispute over them [11]. How­
ever, if one applies the constitutional sentiments approach it is not too 
difficult to identify some national sentiments, namely the frustration 
stemming from the decades-long oppressive Soviet policies trying to 
undermine the Baltic nations’ national identity and existence, as a main 
impetus to that kind of regulation.
II. From the 2000’s some of the Central-European countries — ie. 
Hungary, Romania and Slovakia — enacted special acts providing pref­
erential treatment for those who belong to the same nation in the neigh­
boring countries. Clearly, the concept of nation as a cultural community 
that may transcend official state boundaries backed these acts. These 
were the so-called «status acts» that provided support on the level of 
both: the individual and the minority community [12]. Again, from 
many aspects, as for instance the aspect of regional politics, these acts 
seemed to be quite irrational since they apparently disturbed relation­
ship among these countries. Furthermore, there was also an intensive 
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internal political discussion since the privileges provided by these acts 
were partially questioned by public opinion. However, the primary 
importance of national sentiments as one of the decisive constitutional 
sentiments properly explains why these countries chose that kind of 
unusual extraterritorial legislation to support some minority groups 
having the same national identity in the neighboring countries. It was 
not solely a question of legal and political rationality but also had an 
obvious emotional aspect. This emotional dimension took shape as an 
influential constitutional sentiment and it considerably contributed to 
the birth of these acts.
III. Lastly, national sentiments even manifested in special constitu­
tional provisions declaring the responsibility of these countries for the 
minority groups living outside of the borders. These «national respon­
sibility clauses» are within the first and general articles of the consti­
tutions thereby stressing their constitutional importance. These provi­
sions may be centered around the cultural identity of a given nation as 
a belated sign of cultural nationalism [13], they may form legal basis 
for acts providing special status for those members of the national com­
munity who live in the neighboring countries [14], or may prescribe 
comprehensive obligations for the given countiy to support the com­
munities situated outside the official state borders [15]. Contrary to 
all these divergences, however, these constitutional provisions share 
a common point, they point out to what a high extent the thinking of 
Central-European constitution-makers have been seduced by national 
sentiments stressing the imagined national unity.
In conclusion, national sentiments have gradually been converted 
into a constitutional sentiment considerably affecting the constitutional 
cultures of Central-European countries in the last twenty years. The 
strong and wide-ranging moral support — only a minority, mostly 
intellectuals, has contested the relevance of national sentiments in these 
countries — was a decisive point in their success. Moreover, the Zeit­
geist — so to speak the spirit of the age — also helped them to exert 
influence over public and constitutional affairs as the regional political 
sphere was also opened and sensitive to nationalist policies as com­
pared to the Socialist era.
3. Fear of losing independence
The second sentimental impetus in present-day Central-European 
constitutionalism is undoubtedly fear. It can hardly be debated that fear 
is one of the most influential sources of constitution-making [16], yet, 
the Central-European situation was somewhat different from the gen­
eral, Western pattern. Since the era of Enlightenment the main task of 
many constitutional provisions has been to manage the community’s 
fear of exclusive and tyrannical power [17]. However, this motive 
behind the post-Socialist constitutional development has had a slightly 
different character. Here, fear is coupled with the national existence, 
with special regard to political independence.
One of the main historical experiences of nations in Central- 
Europe is, indeed, their continuous struggle for independence. Peoples 
of this region have had to fight for their independence in the last two 
centuries many times. Just think of modem Polish history. Poland lost 
its real national independence four times after 1795 (1795, 1815,1939, 
1945), although some forms «puppet statehood» have definitely existed 
in these two centuries. Still, political and constitutional autonomy 
only remained a claim of non-realistic nature. Thus, the loss of inde­
pendence and the forthcoming external oppression — that could come 
from both directions, from the West and the East — is a chief exis­
tential experience. As Istvan Bibo, an eminent Hungarian scholar of 
Central-European history argues, it even distorted these peoples’ men­
tality by establishing a special inclination to political hysteria, that is, 
to pure emotional reactions in political questions having an existential 
nature [18].
Therefore, it is not too surprising that this kind of collective fear of 
losing political and national independence have also been transformed 
into a constitutional sentiment in the post-1989 era. Central-European 
constitutions embody it in different ways.
I. The preambles of the region’s constitutions are rich in refer­
ences to various independence fights [19]. These parts of preambles 
stress either the importance of these fights in national remembrance 
or the tragic nature of defeats. As a result, they convert them into the 
constitutional sphere. This phenomenon cannot be overlooked since
the preambles — although their normative value is debated — always 
inspire the legislator and they also create a central narrative for public 
life. So, the struggle for independence got a symbolic place in Cen- 
tral-European constitutionalism, and, therefore, it could contribute to 
the collective management of these frustrations. The phrasing of these 
preambles is always passionate, emotional and solemn. Some parts of 
them are definitely much closer to poetry than to strict legal style and 
vocabulary [20]. If one regards these elements of Central-European 
constitutions as a reflection of a fear for independence as a constitu­
tional sentiment, their real meaning and value become easily identifi­
able. Basically, their task is to manage the frustration stemming from 
lost independence fights on a constitutional level by acknowledging 
their historical role and significance. Thus, public sentiments related to 
tragic national defeats have been transformed into constitutional values 
from historical memory having a rather subjective, relativistic and fluid 
nature.
II. Secondly, this collective fear of losing independence also influ­
enced a very peculiar segment of constitutional provisions. It can be 
argued that those constitutional articles which make the EU accession 
constitutionally possible by creating a clause for the transfer of some 
sovereign competences to the Union level are quite restrictively worded 
in Central-European constitutions [21]. The nature of these «Europe- 
clauses» becomes even more apparent if one compares them to Western 
provisions. For instance, the relevant provision of the Hungarian con­
stitution relies on the term of «joint exercise of competences» when 
regulating the transfer of competences to the EU level. Moreover, it 
stresses that this can only be done to the necessary extent thereby rais­
ing another substantive limit [22]. And, besides practical concerns, this 
unique feature can also be explained by those constitutional sentiments 
that are focused on the preservation of national independence and are 
propelled by the fear for independence [23].
That said, the constitutional-sentiments oriented-approach can 
explain what ordinary constitutional law scholarship cannot do prop­
erly: why these clauses are so different in Central-Europe from the 
Western solutions. They are tailored in a different, perhaps extravagant
way, since they reflect the sovereignty concerns of Central-European 
nations and try to defend them as much as it is possible under the condi­
tions of European Union law.
4. Conclusion
Legal scholarship devoted to the study of constitutional sentiments 
will not solve all the scholarly problems for sure. And, it need not do 
it at all. The integration of emotional components into legal discussion 
can raise further questions expecting novel answers. Nevertheless, the 
above may illustrate how sentiment related studies can help us get a 
more nuanced and refined picture on unconventional problems of con­
stitutional law. The acts and constitutional provisions mentioned above 
seem to be troublesome factors deviating from the Western model as 
long as only strict constitutional law doctrines are applied. However, if 
one regards them as manifestations of specific constitutional sentiments 
having various historical and socio-cultural roots, they immediately 
gain a proper meaning and lose their obscurity. Thus, constitutional 
sentiments are worthy of studying since it may provide us a better and 
clearer view.
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К вопросу о роли компаративистского подхода 
в деятельности органов конституционной юстиции
Современный уровень конституционного судопроизводства 
позволяет выделить в качестве одной из особенностей конститу­
ционного судопроизводства возможность обращения к опыту зару­
бежных стран при вынесении решений. Указанное направление не 
является приоритетным в деятельности конституционных судов, 
однако изучение подобного явления представляется интересным 
и актуальным. В качестве примера можно привести ряд реше­
ний различных конституционных судов, которые анализируют
